

AD-A096 871

VIRGINIA UNIV CHARLOTTESVILLE DEPT OF ENGINEERING SC--ETC F/6 12/2  
DECISION SUPPORT WITH PARTIALLY IDENTIFIED PARAMETERS.(U)  
MAR 81 C C WHITE, A P SAGE, W T SCHERER N00014-80-C-0542  
UVA/SE-81-5 NL

UNCLASSIFIED

1 OF  
AD-A096 871

END  
DATE FILMED  
4-81  
OTIC

AD A 096871

# LEVEL

10

SYSTEMS ENGINEERING RESEARCH REPORT 81-5

## DECISION SUPPORT WITH PARTIALLY IDENTIFIED PARAMETERS

Chelsea C. White  
Andrew P. Sage  
William T. Scherer


Supported by:

Engineering Psychology Programs  
Office of Naval Research  
ONR Contract Number N0014-80-C-0542  
Work Unit Number NR-197-065

Approved for Public Release  
Distribution Unlimited  
Reproduction in Whole or in Part is  
Permitted for Any Use of the U.S. Government

February 1981

DTIC  
ELECTED  
MAR 26 1981



# SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING AND APPLIED SCIENCE

DEPARTMENT OF ENGINEERING SCIENCE AND SYSTEMS

DTMC FILE COPY

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA  
CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA 22901

81326036

## UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER <i>UVTH</i> SE-81-5	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. <i>AD-A096 872</i>	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) <b>DECISION SUPPORT WITH PARTIALLY IDENTIFIED PARAMETERS.</b>	5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED <b>Research Report</b>	
7. AUTHOR(s) <i>Chelsea C. White, III Andrew P. Sage William T. Scherer</i>	6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER <i>N0014-80-C-0542</i>	
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Department of Engineering Science and Systems University of Virginia Charlottesville, Virginia 22901	10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS <b>NR-197-065</b>	
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Engr. Psychology Programs Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Research Arlington, Virginia 22217	12. REPORT DATE <b>March 15, 1981</b>	
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office) <i>Office of Naval Research</i>	13. NUMBER OF PAGES <i>15</i>	
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)  <b>Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited</b>	15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) <b>Unclassified</b>	
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES <b>None</b>		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) <b>Decision Support Systems Multiple Objectives Partial Preference Information</b>		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) <b>In this paper, we investigate the problem of determining a preference structure on the set of alternatives for a general class of single-stage, choice making models with imprecisely known parameters. A variety of decision making problems under certainty and under uncertainty are modeled by the general problem formulation. The imprecisely known parameters can be, for example, attribute trade-off weights, value scores, probabilities, and utility values. Parameter imprecision is described by assuming that certain groups of parameters are</b>		

*401961*

20.

members of given sets. This description forms the basis for a general and behaviorally relevant assessment model. Solution procedures for four important special cases of the general problem formulation are determined. A hypothetical automobile purchasing problem is used to illustrate the decision aiding applicability of the results.

<b>Accession For</b>	
NTIS	GRA&I <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Justification</b>	
By _____	
Distribution/ _____	
Availability Codes _____	
DIST	Avail and/or Special
A	

DTIC  
ELECTED  
MAR 26 1981  
S D

DECISION SUPPORT WITH PARTIALLY  
IDENTIFIED PARAMETERS\*

by

Chelsea C. White, III  
Andrew P. Sage  
and  
William T. Scherer

Department of Engineering Science and Systems  
Thornton Hall  
University of Virginia  
Charlottesville, VA 22901  
(804) 924-5395

ABSTRACT:

→ In this paper, we investigate the problem of determining a preference structure on the set of alternatives for a general class of single-stage, choice making models with imprecisely known parameters. A variety of decision making problems under certainty and under uncertainty are modeled by the general problem formulation. The imprecisely known parameters can be, for example, attribute trade-off weights, value scores, probabilities, and utility values. Parameter imprecision is described by assuming that certain groups of parameters are members of given sets. This description forms the basis for a general and behaviorally relevant assessment model. Solution procedures for four important special cases of the general problem formulation are determined. A hypothetical automobile purchasing problem is used to illustrate the decision aiding applicability of the results.

\*This research has been supported by ONR Contract N0014-80-C-0542.

## I. INTRODUCTION

Analytic, normative models of decisionmaking often require precise identification of various parameter values prior to the calculation of a most preferred alternative. For example, the multiattribute decision aids described by Kelly (1978) and Edwards (1977) require that the decision maker (DM) provide attribute trade-off weights which give a quantitative description of the relative importance of the various objectives under consideration. As another example, the subjective expected utility approach associated with decisionmaking problems under risk assumes knowledge of subjective outcome probabilities for each alternative (Spetzler, 1975). Sensitivity analysis is often used to develop measures of confidence in the optimality of the most preferred alternative with regards to the perceived credibility of the identified parameter values. In practice, such sensitivity analyses usually can deal only with the variation of a single parameter at a time, c. f. (Kelly, 1978), although in reality several parameters are often not known exactly and multi-parameter variations may produce results significantly different than a direct combination of a series of single-parametric variations (White, 1979).

Exact knowledge of parameter values has its advantages and disadvantages. An obvious advantage is that once all parameters are precisely specified, a real-valued criterion will always be able to select a most preferred alternative. A disadvantage is that precise parameter identification, through either objective or subjective assessment, can be stressful and time and effort consuming, c. f. (Fischhoff, et. al., 1980) for studies in cognitive psychology which support this

statement in more general contexts. Such demands, and the fact that the DM may find the elicitation effort so strange and strained that perspectives are lost rather than strengthened, may render the entire decision aiding effort less than completely useful. For example, precise determination of trade-off weights in a military crisis management situation may require more time than is available for the entire decision aiding process.

Interestingly, preliminary evaluation results of a recently developed medical decision aid for diagnosing a common ambulatory complaint (White, et. al. 1980) support the following hypothesis: DM's may not require identification of the most preferred alternative by a decision aid but may only require the elimination of all but a few alternatives, with appropriate data display, in order to confidently select a most preferred alternative for implementation. This hypothesis suggests that if DM's do not necessarily find it essential to totally order the alternatives, then it may also be unnecessary to precisely identify all parameters. Relaxing the need to determine all parameter values exactly, or even to elicit them, may significantly enhance the acceptability of the decision aiding approach by reducing the likelihood that various institutional, organizational and behavioral constraints will be violated.

The above comments have stimulated the development of a decision aiding approach for multiobjective decision aiding that allows the DM to interactively determine a preferred mix of alternative discrimination specificity and parameter estimate accuracy (White and Sage, 1980, 1981). Assuming that the basic problem has already been structured,

the general steps of this approach are as follows:

1. Eliminate as many alternatives as possible using currently available information about the values of the imprecisely known parameters.
2. If an alternative can be selected for implementation without further alternative elimination, then stop.
3. If a choice cannot be made, then assess further information about the values of the imprecisely known parameters and return to Step 1.

The procedure for iteratively assessing the imprecisely known parameters with increasing accuracy that is presented by White and Sage (1980) appears to have substantial behavioral acceptability. It seems likely, however, that the acceptability of the general decision aiding approach may increase significantly with a more general assessment model. The assessment model due to White and Sage (1980) requires that some but not necessarily all trade-off weight ratios be precisely specified. (In contrast, the decision aid described in (Kelly, 1978) requires that all such trade-off weight ratios be precisely specified before search for the most preferred alternative can begin.) Humans, however, may often find it easier and more natural to place bounds on these ratios. The intent of this paper is to examine the implications of allowing ratios of parameter values to be imprecisely described in terms of upper and/or lower bounds for a broad class of single-stage decisionmaking models.

The paper is outlined as follows. The general, single-stage problem formulation is presented and discussed in Section 2. We note

that this problem formulation models many multiobjective decision making problems under risk. Five special and relevant cases of the general problem formulation are displayed in Section 3, four of which are treated in depth in this paper. Transitivity and set inclusion results are determined in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. In Section 6, we present three different procedures for determining a preference structure on the alternative set for one of the special cases. Procedures for determining or approximating a preference structure on the alternative set for the other three cases of interest are presented in Section 7. In Section 8, a hypothetical automobile purchasing problem, originally considered by White and Sage (1980), is reconsidered in the context of the new assessment model presented in this paper. The intent of this hypothetical example is to illustrate the behavioral relevance of our assessment model and several other decision aiding implications of our results. Conclusions are presented in the final section.

## II. THE BASIC PROBLEM FORMULATION AND DISCUSSION

We now present the basic problem formulation. Let  $A = \{1, 2, \dots, A\}$  be the finite set of alternatives available to the DM. The DM is allowed to select one alternative from  $A$ . The criterion on which selection is based is

$$\sum_{m=1}^M \sum_{n=1}^N \eta_m(a) U_{mn}(a) \rho_n(a) = \eta(a) U(a) \rho(a)$$

where  $\eta(a) \in R_M = \{\eta \in R^M: 0 \leq \eta_m, m=1, \dots, M, \sum_m \eta_m = 1\}$ ,  $\rho(a) \in R_N$ , and  $U(a) \in C_{M \times N} = \{U \in R^{M \times N}: 0 \leq U_{mn} \leq 1, m = 1, \dots, M, n = 1, \dots, N\}$ . (If  $\eta$  premultiplies (postmultiplies) a vector or a matrix, then  $\eta$  will be considered a row (column) vector.)

We assume that there is a set  $\Lambda(a', a) \subseteq (R_M \times C_{M \times N} \times R_N)^2$  associated with every ordered pair  $(a', a) \in A \times A$ . Let  $\Lambda = \{\Lambda(a', a): (a', a) \in A \times A\}$ .

The objective of the problem is: given  $A$  and  $\Lambda$ , determine the subset  $R(A, \Lambda) \subseteq A \times A$  such that  $(a', a) \in R(A, \Lambda)$  if and only if

$$\eta' U' \rho' \geq \eta U \rho$$

for all  $(\eta', U', \rho', \eta, U, \rho) \in \Lambda(a', a)$ .

The motivation for examining this general problem formulation is that it models several important classes of single-stage decision making problems having partially identified parameters. The most general of these classes of problems is the multiattribute decisionmaking problem under risk, where:

- $M$  is the number of attributes under consideration.
- $N$  is the number of outcomes that can result from alternative selection.
- $n_m(a)$  is the trade-off weight assigned to attribute  $m$  if alternative  $a$  is selected ( $n_m(a)$  is usually assumed alternative invariant).
- $\rho_n(a)$  is the probability that outcome  $n$  will occur if alternative  $a$  is selected.
- $U_{mn}(a)$  is the utility of selecting alternative  $a$  and receiving outcome  $n$  with respect to attribute  $m$ .
- $n(a) U(a) \rho(a)$  is the expected utility of selecting alternative  $a$ .
- $\Lambda(a', a)$  represents what information is available regarding the value of the 6-tuple  $\{n(a'), U(a'), \rho(a'), n(a), U(a), \rho(a)\}$ .
- $R(A, \Lambda)$  represents what information can be induced from  $A$  and  $\Lambda$  regarding preferences on  $A$ .
- The form of the multiattribute utility function is additive.

The set of ordered pairs  $R(A, \Lambda)$  can represent a valuable aid in alternative selection. If there is an  $a' \in A$  such that  $(a', a) \in R(A, \Lambda)$  for all  $a \in A$ , then  $a'$  is an optimal alternative. Additionally, if  $(a, a') \notin R(A, \Lambda)$  for all  $a \neq a'$ , then  $a'$  is a unique optimal alternative. More generally, the nondominated set of  $R(A, \Lambda)^*$  is guaranteed to contain the most preferred alternative. Thus, knowledge

---

\* Alternative  $a \in A$  is said to be dominated if there is an  $a' \in A$  such that  $(a', a) \in R(A, \Lambda)$  and  $(a, a') \notin R(A, \Lambda)$ . The set of all alternatives in  $A$  that are not dominated is called the nondominated set of  $R(A, \Lambda)$ .

of  $R(A, \Lambda)$  can enhance decisionmaking, even for the case where  $\Lambda$  does not provide enough information to identify an optimal alternative, by eliminating alternatives that are clearly inferior.

### III. SPECIAL CASES

We now present several specializations of the basic problem formulation.

CASE 1. Let  $\Lambda_1(a', a) = \{n(a')\} \times \{U(a')\} \times \{\rho(a')\} \times \{n(a)\} \times \{U(a)\} \times \{\rho(a)\}$  for all  $(a', a) \in A \times A$ . Then  $n(a)$ ,  $U(a)$ , and  $\rho(a)$  are known precisely for all  $a \in A$ . This case is a standard decision analysis problem formulation having an additive, multiattribute utility function. If  $n(a) = (0, \dots, 1, \dots, 0)$  for all  $a \in A$ , then this case is the single attribute decision analysis problem under risk; if  $\rho(a) = (0, \dots, 1, \dots, 0)$  for all  $a \in A$ , then this case is the multiattribute decision analysis problem under certainty.

CASE 2. Let  $\Lambda_2(a', a)$  be the set of all 6-tuples  $(n(a'), U(a'), \rho(a'), n(a), U(a), \rho(a))$  such that  $U(a')$ ,  $\rho(a')$ ,  $U(a)$ , and  $\rho(a)$  are all members of sets containing a single point (and hence are known exactly) and  $n(a') = n(a) \in N = \{n \in R_M : Bn \leq b\} \neq \emptyset$ , for given matrix  $B$  and vector  $b$ . Thus, the trade-off weights are assumed alternative invariant and only partially identified by linear inequalities.

If we interchange the interpretation of  $n$  and  $\rho$ , then this case also considers the situation where outcome probabilities are assumed alternative invariant and partially identified. In fact, it will be valuable for us to do so for comparative purposes. Therefore, define  $\tilde{\Lambda}_2(a', a)$  to be the set of all 6-tuples  $(n(a'), U(a'), \rho(a'), n(a), U(a), \rho(a))$  such that  $n(a')$ ,  $U(a')$ ,  $n(a)$ ,  $U(a)$  are known precisely and  $\rho(a') = \rho(a) \in P = \{\rho \in R_N : C\rho \leq c\} = \emptyset$ .

CASE 3. Let

$$\Lambda_3(a', a) = \Omega_3(a') \times \Omega_3(a)$$

where  $\Omega_3(a) = \{n(a)\} \times \{U(a)\} \times P(a)$  and  $P(a) = \{\rho \in R_N : C(a)\rho \leq c(a)\} \neq \emptyset$  for given matrix  $C(a)$  and vector  $c(a)$ ,  $a \in A$ . Thus, trade-off weights and utilities are known exactly but the probability mass functions are not necessarily equal and only partially identified by linear inequalities.

CASE 4. Let

$$\Lambda_4(a', a) = \Omega_4(a') \times \Omega_4(a)$$

where

$$\Omega_4(a) = N(a) \times \{U(a)\} \times P(a)$$

$$N(a) = \{n \in R_M : B(a)n \leq b(a)\}$$

$$P(a) = \{n \in R_N : C(a)n \leq c(a)\}$$

Thus,  $U(a)$  is known exactly but  $n(a)$  and  $\rho(a)$  are only imprecisely known. This case considers the situation where both the single attribute utility function  $n(a)$  and the probability mass function  $\rho(a)$  are only imprecisely known, where  $U(a) = I$  for all  $a \in A$ .

CASE 5. Let

$$\Lambda_5(a', a) = \Omega_5(a') \times \Omega_5(a)$$

where

$$\Omega_5(a') = N(a) \times U(a) \times P(a)$$

$N(a)$  is a convex polytope described by extreme points  
 $\{n^\ell(a), \ell = 1, \dots, L(a)\}$

$U(a)$  is a convex polytope described by extreme points  
 $\{U^k(a), k = 1, \dots, K(a)\}$

$P(a) \subseteq R_N$ .

Thus, trade-off weights, outcome probabilities and utilities are all imprecisely known.

#### IV. TRANSITIVITY RESULTS

A clearly desirable characteristic of any relation concerned with preference is transitivity.\* We now present conditions on  $\Lambda$  which imply that  $R(A, \Lambda)$  is transitive and show that these conditions hold for all  $\Lambda_i$ ,  $i = 1, \dots, 5$ .

THEOREM 1. Assume for any triple  $(a, a', a'') \in A^3$  such that  $(a'', a') \in R(A, \Lambda)$  and  $(a', a) \in R(A, \Lambda)$ , the sets

$$\{(n', U', \rho'): (n'', U'', \rho'', n', U', \rho') \in \Lambda(a'', a')\}$$

and

$$\{(n', U', \rho'): (n', U', \rho', n, U, \rho) \in \Lambda(a', a)\}$$

have nonnull intersection for all  $(n'', U'', \rho'', n, U, \rho) \in \Lambda(a'', a)$ .

Then,  $R(A, \Lambda)$  is transitive.

Proof: Assume  $(a'', a') \in R(A, \Lambda)$  and  $(a', a) \in R(A, \Lambda)$ ; we wish to show that  $(a'', a) \in R(A, \Lambda)$ . Consider any  $(n'', U'', \rho'', n, U, \rho) \in \Lambda(a'', a)$ . By assumption, there exists a triple  $(\bar{n}, \bar{U}, \bar{\rho})$  such that

$$(\bar{n}, \bar{U}, \bar{\rho}) \in \{(n', U', \rho'): (n'', U'', \rho'', n', U', \rho') \in \Lambda(a'', a')\}$$

$$\cap \{(n', U', \rho'): (n', U', \rho', n, U, \rho) \in \Lambda(a', a)\}.$$

Since  $(a'', a'), (a', a) \in R(A, \Lambda)$ ,  $n'' U'' \rho'' \geq \bar{n} \bar{U} \bar{\rho}$  and  $\bar{n} \bar{U} \bar{\rho} \geq n U \rho$  and hence  $n'' U'' \rho'' \geq n U \rho$ . Since this result holds for

\*The relation  $R(A, \Lambda)$  is said to be transitive if for all  $a, a'$ , and  $a''$  such that  $(a'', a') \in R(A, \Lambda)$  and  $(a', a) \in R(A, \Lambda)$ , it follows that  $(a'', a) \in R(A, \Lambda)$ .

any  $(n'', U'', \rho'', n, U, \rho) \in \Lambda(a'', a)$ ,  $(a'', a) \in R(A, \Lambda)$ . □

COROLLARY 1.  $R(A, \Lambda_i)$  is transitive for  $i = 1, \dots, 5$ .

Proof: Throughout the proof, it is useful to note that  $(n', U', \rho', n, U, \rho) \in \Lambda_i(a', a)$  if and only if  $(n', U', \rho', n, U, \rho) \in \Lambda_i(a, a')$  for all  $(a', a) \in A \times A$  and all  $i = 1, \dots, 5$ .

Case 1. Trivial; in fact  $R(A, \Lambda_1)$  linearly orders  $A$ .

Case 2. Note that for any  $(n'', U'', \rho'', n, U, \rho) \in \Lambda_2(a'', a)$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} &\{(n', U', \rho'): (n'', U'', \rho'', n', U', \rho') \in \Lambda_2(a'', a')\} \\ &= \{(n', U', \rho'): (n', U', \rho', n, U, \rho) \in \Lambda_2(a', a)\} \\ &= \{n(a')\} \times \{U(a')\} \times \{\rho\} \neq \emptyset. \end{aligned}$$

The result then holds from Theorem 1.

Cases 3, 4, and 5. Note that for any  $(n'', U'', \rho'', n, U, \rho) \in \Lambda_5(a'', a)$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} &\{(n', U', \rho'): (n', U', \rho', n, U, \rho) \in \Lambda_5(a', a)\} \\ &= \{(n', U', \rho'): (n'', U'', \rho'', n', U', \rho') \in \Lambda_5(a'', a')\} \\ &= N(a') \times U(a') \times P(a') \neq \emptyset. \end{aligned}$$

Thus, the hypothesis of Theorem 1 is satisfied for cases 3, 4, and 5, since cases 3 and 4 are specializations of case 5. □

## V. SET INCLUSION RESULTS

In this section, we derive several useful set inclusion results. The first result, Lemma 1, suggests a general approach for decision support. The second result, Corollary 2, has potential computational significance. Proofs of both results follow directly from the appropriate definitions.

LEMMA 1. If  $\Lambda' \subseteq \Lambda$ , then  $R(A, \Lambda') \subseteq R(A, \Lambda)$ .

Lemma 1 suggests the following general approach to decision aiding:

0. Set  $k = 0$  and  $\Lambda^0 = R_M \times C_{M \times N} \times R_N$ .
1. Determine  $R(A, \Lambda^k)$ .
2. If  $R(A, \Lambda^k)$  provides a sufficient amount of information for alternative selection, then stop. If not, then go to Step 3.
3. Perform assessment procedures to produce  $\Lambda^{k+1} \subseteq \Lambda^k$ , set  $k = k + 1$ , and go to Step 1.

We will present an application of this approach to a hypothetical automobile purchasing example in Section 8.

We now indicate the various relationships that can exist between the various  $R(A, \Lambda_i)$ . Proof of the following corollary follows directly from Lemma 1.

COROLLARY 2. (a)  $R(A, \Lambda_5) \subseteq R(A, \Lambda_4) \subseteq R(A, \Lambda_3) \overset{\sim}{\subseteq} R(A, \Lambda_1)$ . (b) If  $P \subseteq P(a)$  for all  $a \in A$ , then  $R(A, \Lambda_3) \subseteq R(A, \Lambda_2) \subseteq R(A, \Lambda_1)$ .

The operational usefulness of the results presented in Corollary 2 is that if  $R(A, \Lambda_i)$  is difficult to determine but that  $R(A, \Lambda_j)$  and/or  $R(A, \Lambda_k)$  are relatively simple to calculate and  $R(A, \Lambda_j) \subseteq R(A, \Lambda_i) \subseteq R(A, \Lambda_k)$ , then knowledge of  $R(A, \Lambda_j)$  and/or  $R(A, \Lambda_k)$  and use of the transitivity of these relations can be helpful in aiding alternative selection and/or mollifying the difficulty in computing  $R(A, \Lambda_i)$ .

## VI. SOLUTION PROCEDURES FOR $R(A, \overset{\sim}{\Lambda}_2)$ :

We now present three procedures for determining  $R(A, \overset{\sim}{\Lambda}_2)$ . The first two assume that the parameter set  $P$  is described in terms of linear inequalities; the third procedure assumes that  $P$  is equivalently defined as the convex hull of a finite number of extreme points.

(a) The One-Pass Procedure. The one-pass procedure is based in part on the so-called one-pass algorithm presented in (Smallwood and Sondik, 1973) for a more complex problem formulation. (See also (Potter and Anderson, 1980). Our one-pass procedure is composed of two steps:

1. Determine the set of all possible linear orders that the alternatives can have for parameters in  $P$ .
2. Generate  $R(A, \overset{\sim}{\Lambda}_2)$  from the above linear orders.

The approach used to complete Step 1 will also determine the regions in  $P$  where each of the linear orders obtained is optimal. The determination of such regions has obvious use in a sensitivity analysis. We now describe each of the above two steps.

Step 1. Observe that any point in  $P$  generates a linear ordering of the alternatives. For example, assume for  $\rho^0 \in P$ ,  $\gamma(a)_{\rho^0} \geq \gamma(a+1)_{\rho^0}$ ,  $a = 1, \dots, A-1$ , for  $\gamma(a) = n(a) U(a)$ . That is, alternative 1 is preferred to alternative 2, which is preferred to alternative 3, and so forth. Thus,  $\rho^0$  is associated with the linear order  $\{1, \dots, A\}$ . In fact, all points in the region  $R^0 = \{\rho \in P: [\gamma(a) - \gamma(a+1)]_{\rho} \geq 0, a = 1, \dots, A-1\}$  are associated with the linear order  $\{1, \dots, A\}$ .

Note that  $R^0$  is a convex polytope; procedures for determining which constraints of the form  $[\gamma(a) - \gamma(a+1)] \rho \geq 0$  are not redundant are surveyed in (Mattheis and Rubin, 1980). We observe that  $R^0$  is bounded by linear inequalities describing  $P$  and  $R$  and those of the form  $[\gamma(a) - \gamma(a+1)] \rho \geq 0$ . On the "other side" of the latter type of boundary,  $\gamma(a+1)\rho > \gamma(a)\rho$  for some  $1 \leq a \leq A-1$  and hence two alternatives which are adjacent in rank for  $\rho \in R^0$  have switched positions in the linear ordering, producing a new linear order, new inequalities, and a new region in  $P$  having a constant linear ordering. Clearly, this new region is also a convex polytope. The set of all necessary inequalities for  $R^0$  of the form  $[\gamma(a) - \gamma(a+1)] \rho \geq 0$  indicates what regions in  $P$  having a constant linear ordering border  $R^0$ . Successively examining these regions, determining their associated linear orders, and discovering other convex polytopes having constant linear orders will eventually produce a set  $\{R^j\}$  of convex polytopes with constant linear orders which covers  $P$ ; i.e.,  $P = \bigcup_j R^j$ . The objective then becomes to take the set of linear orders associated with the set  $\{R^j\}$  and produce a preference relation on the alternative set.

Step 2. Let  $S$  be an  $A \times A$  matrix composed as follows:

- (i) if for any of the linear orders determined in Step 1, alternative  $a'$  is preferred to alternative  $a$ , then set the  $(a', a)$  entry of  $S$  to 1; set all other entries equal to 0.
- (ii) if the  $(a, a')$  and  $(a', a)$  entries are both 1, set them both to 0.

The matrix  $S$ , often called a subordination matrix, provides necessary information for the construction of a domination digraph. See (Sage, 1977) for details. Such a digraph is a graphical depiction of  $R(A, \gamma_2)$ . The following example illustrates the concepts presented.

EXAMPLE 1. Assume  $A = 4$ ,  $N = 3$ , and


	$\gamma_1(a)$	$\gamma_2(a)$	$\gamma_3(a)$
$a=1$	0.5	1	0
$a=2$	1	0.5	0.5
$a=3$	0.5	1	0.5
$a=4$	0.5	0	1

The associated domination digraph is given in Figure 1a, indicating that on the basis of the three objectives under consideration and the usual product order on  $R_3$ , i.e. the assumption that  $\rho \in R_3$ , alternative 3 dominates alternative 1. Assume the DM has revealed preferences that indicate  $\rho_1 \geq \rho_3$ ,  $\rho_2 \geq \rho_3$ , and  $\rho_3 \leq 0.25$ . This region in  $R_3$  is depicted graphically in Figure 2. Note that this description of  $P$  is equivalent to the existence of a  $3 \times 3$  matrix  $C$  and a 3-vector  $c$  such that


$$C = \begin{bmatrix} -1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & -1 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \quad C \rho \leq c$$

$$c = \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 0.25 \end{bmatrix}$$

where  $P = \{\rho \in R_3: C\rho \leq c\}$ .



(a)



(b)

Figure 1. The Domination Digraphs for (a)  $R_3$  and (b)  $P$  for Examples 1 and 2.




Figure 2. The Set  $P = R^0 \cup R^1 \cup R^2$  and the Subregions  $R^0$ ,  $R^1$ , and  $R^2$  for Examples 1 and 2.

To start the algorithm, let  $\rho^0 = \text{col} (0.90, 0.07, 0.03)$ . We note that  $\gamma(2)\rho^0 \geq \gamma(3)\rho^0 \geq \gamma(1)\rho^0 \geq \gamma(4)\rho^0$ . Let  $R^0 = \{\rho \in P: \gamma(2)\rho \geq \gamma(3)\rho \geq \gamma(1)\rho \geq \gamma(4)\rho\}$ .  $R^0$  is bounded by the equality  $\gamma(2)\rho = \gamma(3)\rho$ . Thus, an adjacent subregion is  $R^1 = \{\rho \in P: \gamma(3)\rho \geq \gamma(2)\rho \geq \gamma(1)\rho \geq \gamma(4)\rho\}$ .  $R^1$  is bounded by the equality  $\gamma(1)\rho = \gamma(2)\rho$  and hence has an adjacent subregion  $R^2 = \{\rho \in P: \gamma(3)\rho \geq \gamma(1)\rho \geq \gamma(2)\rho \geq \gamma(4)\rho\}$ . Since  $U_i R^i = P$ , we have completed our "one-pass" over the region  $P$ . The various subregions of  $P$  are presented in Figure 2. The possible linear orderings of the alternatives are therefore:  $\{2, 3, 1, 4\}$  for  $R^0$ ,  $\{3, 2, 1, 4\}$  for  $R^1$ , and  $\{3, 1, 2, 4\}$  for  $R^2$ . These linear orders produce the following subordination matrix

$$\begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

The resulting domination digraph is presented in Figure 1b. We observe that restricting  $\rho$  to  $P$  has guaranteed that both 1 and 2 now dominate 4 and that 3 continues to dominate 1. □

b. The Linear Programming Approach. Define

$$z^*(a', a) = \min_{\rho \in P} [\gamma(a') - \gamma(a)]\rho$$

Clearly,

(i)  $(a', a) \in R(A, \gamma_2)$  if and only if  $z^*(a', a) \geq 0$ .

(ii)  $(a', a) \notin R(A, \lambda_2)$  if and only if there exists a  $\rho \in P$  such that  $[\gamma(a') - \gamma(a)]\rho < 0$ .

Thus, (i) implies that the alternatives can be related by considering the sign of the optimal criterion value of  $A(A-1)$  linear programs; (ii) implies that if there is a basic feasible solution  $\rho$  such that  $[\gamma(a') - \gamma(a)]\rho$  is negative, then the linear program evaluating the pair  $(a', a)$  can conclude that  $(a', a) \notin R(A, \lambda_2)$  without having to satisfy optimality conditions. This procedure applied to Example 1 required the consideration of 11 linear programs  $((3, 4) \in R(A, \lambda_2)$  was determined by transitivity from previously obtained  $(1, 4) \in R(A, \lambda_2)$  and  $(3, 1) \in R(A, \lambda_2)$ ), 3 of which were terminated before completion because the criterion value went negative before optimality conditions were satisfied. The results were in agreement with the results of Example 1.

c. The Transformation Approach. Assume that  $P$  is described as the convex hull of the set of (extreme) points  $\{\beta^l, l=1, \dots, L\}$ . Procedures for determining  $\{\beta^l\}$  from  $C$  and  $c$  are contained in (Mattheis and Rubin, 1980). The transformation approach for determining the domination digraph for  $\rho$  restricted to  $P$  is based on the following fact:  $\gamma' \beta^l \geq \gamma \beta^l$  for all  $l = 1, \dots, L$  if and only if  $\gamma' \rho \geq \gamma \rho$  for all  $\rho \in P$ . Note that when  $P = R_N$ , it follows that  $L = N$ ,  $\beta^l = \text{col}(0, \dots, 1, \dots, 0)$  where the 1 is the  $l^{\text{th}}$  entry, and  $\gamma' \beta^l \geq \gamma \beta^l$  for all  $l$  is equivalent to  $\gamma'_n \geq \gamma_n$  for all  $n$ . The above if and only if condition suggests the following procedure:

1. Determine  $\gamma(a)\beta^l$  for all  $l$  and  $a$ .

2. Construct a digraph of alternatives, based on the relation:  $(a', a) \in R'$  if and only if  $\gamma(a')\beta^\ell \geq \gamma(a)\beta^\ell$   
 $\ell = 1, \dots, L$ .

Thus,  $\gamma(a)\beta^\ell$ ,  $\ell=1, \dots, L$ , acts like the set of value scores for alternative  $a$  based on  $P$ .

EXAMPLE 2. Consider the problem presented in Example 1. Note that  $L = 4$  and

	$\ell=1$	2	3	4
$\beta_1^\ell$	1	0	.50	.25
$\beta_2^\ell$	0	1	.25	.50
$\beta_3^\ell$	0	0	.25	.25

The  $\beta^\ell$  are graphically depicted in Figure 2.

It then follows that

	$\ell = 1$	2	3	4
$\gamma(1)\beta^\ell$	1	2	1.00	1.25
$\gamma(2)\beta^\ell$	2	1	1.50	1.25
$\gamma(3)\beta^\ell$	1	2	1.25	1.50
$\gamma(4)\beta^\ell$	1	0	1.00	0.75

which produces a digraph identical to the digraph in Figure 1b.  $\square$

The one-pass and the linear programming procedures are preferred over the transformation procedure for two reasons. First, we feel that parameter value information is more easily and more directly

described mathematically in the form  $P = \{p \in R_N : C_p \leq c\}$  rather than in terms of extreme points of  $P$ , a statement to which the automobile purchasing example in Section 8 provides support. Second, determining the extreme points of a set of the form  $P = \{p \in R_N : C_p \leq c\}$ , which is required in order to use the transformation approach, appears generally to require considerably more computational effort than is saved by the relative computational simplicity of the transformation approach. A clear advantage of the linear programming procedure over the one-pass procedure is the relative availability of efficient linear programming software. The one-pass approach, however, provides more information about the ordering of the alternatives in that in Step 1, regions of  $P$  associated with total orders are determined. Such information would be necessary in order to determine how much a parameter vector would have to vary away from the nominal in order to compromise the optimality of the most preferred alternative relative to the nominal.

## VII. SOLUTION PROCEDURES AND APPROXIMATIONS FOR $R(A, \Lambda_i)$ , $i = 3,4,5$ .

Since  $\Lambda_i(a', a) = \Omega_i(a') \times \Omega_i(a)$  for  $i = 3,4,5$ , a necessary and sufficient condition for  $(a', a) \in R(A, \Lambda_i)$  is

$$\min n' U' \rho' \geq \max n U \rho$$

where the minimum is taken with respect to all  $(n', U', \rho') \in \Omega_i(a')$  and the maximum is taken with respect to all  $(n, U, \rho) \in \Omega_i(a)$ .

Therefore, in order to determine  $R(A, \Lambda_i)$ , it is sufficient to solve 2A mathematical programming problems, half of which are minimization problems and half of which are maximization problems. We now examine cases 3, 4, and 5 on the basis of these comments.

(a)  $R(A, \Lambda_3)$ . The solution of

$$\max/min n U \rho$$

for all  $(n, U, \rho) \in \Omega_3(a)$  is a linear program of the form

$$\max/min \gamma \rho$$

$$\text{s.t. } C\rho \leq c$$

$$\rho \in R_N$$

We now illustrate the determination of  $R(A, \Lambda_3)$  with the following example.

EXAMPLE 3. Let  $\gamma$  be given as in Example 1, and assume that  $P(a) = P$  for all  $a \in A$  for the set  $P$  presented in Example 1. Thus,  $\Lambda_3$  is identical to the  $\Lambda_2$  given in Example 1 except that  $\rho$  and  $\rho'$  are not constrained to be equal. The solution of the requisite 8 linear programs generates the domination digraph shown in Figure 3. We note

that by comparing Figure 1b and Figure 3,  $R(A, \Lambda_3) \subseteq R(A, \Lambda_2)$  (observe that  $(3, 1) \in R(A, \Lambda_2)$ ,  $(3, 1) \notin R(A, \Lambda_3)$ ), which is in agreement with Corollary 2b. Note also that had  $R(A, \Lambda_3)$  been determined before  $R(A, \Lambda_2)$ , 3 of the (at most) 12 linear programs required to determine  $R(A, \Lambda_2)$  could have been eliminated. □

(b)  $R(A, \Lambda_4)$ . The solution of

$$\max/\min \ n \ U \rho$$

for all  $(n, U, \rho) \in \Omega_4(a)$  is a quadratic program of the form

$$\max/\min \ n \ U \rho$$

$$\text{s. t. } Bn \leq b$$

$$C\rho \leq c$$

$$n \in R_M, \quad \rho \in R_N.$$

Since the  $2M \times 2N$  matrix

$$\begin{bmatrix} 0 & U \\ U & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

is neither positive semidefinite nor negative semidefinite, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for both the minimization and the maximization problems are only necessary.

The Kuhn-Tucker conditions, however, can be used to determine upper and lower bounds on the criteria associated with the minimization and maximization problems, respectively. These bounds can then be used to generate a relation on  $A \times A$  that bounds  $R(A, \Lambda_4)$  from above. Specifically, let  $z^*(a)$  be an upper bound on the criterion associated with the minimization problem for alternative  $a$ ; similarly,




Figure 3. Domination Digraph for  $\Lambda_3$  in Example 3.

let  $z_*(a)$  be a lower bound on the criterion associated with the maximization problem for alternative  $a$ . Define the relation  $R'(A, \Delta_4)$  as follows:  $(a', a) \in R'(A, \Delta_4)$  if and only if  $z^*(a') \geq z_*(a)$ . Note that  $R'(A, \Delta_4)$  is transitive if  $z_*(a) \geq z^*(a)$  for all  $a \in A$ . Clearly, if  $(a', a) \in R(A, \Delta_4)$ , then  $(a', a) \in R'(A, \Delta_4)$ , which leads to the following addition to Corollary 2.

LEMMA 2.  $R(A, \Delta_4) \subseteq R'(A, \Delta_4)$  and hence  $R(A, \Delta_4) \subseteq R'(A, \Delta_4) \cap R(A, \Delta_3)$ .

The following example illustrates determination of  $R'(A, \Delta_4)$ .

EXAMPLE 4. Consider the problem stated in Example 3 except that

$$0.40 \leq \gamma_2(2) = 0.60$$

$$0.40 \leq \gamma_3(2) \leq 0.60$$

$$0.40 \leq \gamma_1(3) \leq 0.60$$

$$0.40 \leq \gamma_3(3) \leq 0.60$$

Thus, both utilities and probabilities are imprecisely known and can be alternative dependent. The concomitant domination digraph, determined using the solutions of the associated quadratic programming problems, is presented in Figure 4. We note that  $\{(1, 4)\} = R'(A, \Delta_4)$ . It then follows from Lemma 2 that  $R(A, \Delta_4) \subseteq \{(1, 4)\}$ .  $\square$

(c)  $R(A, \Delta_5)$ . The solution of

$$\max/\min \eta U \rho$$

for all  $(\eta, U, \rho) \in \Omega_5(a)$  is in general more difficult than the mathematical programming problems associated with the determination of




Figure 4. Domination Digraph for  $R'(A, \wedge_4)$  in Example 4.

$R(A, \Lambda_i)$ ,  $i = 1, \dots, 4$ . It is possible, however, to construct a specially structured  $\Lambda$  such that  $R(A, \Lambda) \subseteq R(A, \Lambda_5)$  and such that  $R(A, \Lambda)$  can be determined using the quadratic programming procedure developed for determining  $R(A, \Lambda_4)$ . We define such a  $\Lambda$  after presenting the following result.

LEMMA 3. Let  $N \subseteq R_M$  and  $U \subseteq C_{M \times N}$  be convex polytopes having extreme points  $\{n^\ell, \ell=1, \dots, L\}$  and  $\{U^k, k=1, \dots, K\}$ , respectively. Define  $\Gamma = \{nU: n \in N, U \in U\}$  and  $H$  to be the convex hull of  $\{n^\ell U^k, \ell=1, \dots, L, k=1, \dots, K\}$ . Then,  $\Gamma \subseteq H$ . Additionally, assume that  $\Gamma$  is convex. Then  $\Gamma = H$ .

PROOF: Assume  $\gamma \in \Gamma$ . Then, there is a  $n \in N$  and a  $U \in U$  such that  $\gamma = nU$ . Since both  $N$  and  $U$  are both convex polytopes, there exist  $\{\lambda_\ell\} \in R_L$  and  $\{\sigma_k\} \in R_K$  such that  $n = \sum_\ell \lambda_\ell n^\ell$  and  $U = \sum_k \sigma_k U^k$ . Note that  $\gamma = nU = \sum_\ell \sum_k \lambda_\ell \sigma_k n^\ell U^k$  and that  $\{\lambda_\ell \sigma_k\} \in R_{L \times K}$ . Thus,  $\gamma \in H$ .

If  $\Gamma$  is convex and contains the extreme points of  $H$ , then  $H \subseteq \Gamma$  and hence  $\Gamma = H$ .  $\square$

Let  $\Gamma(a) = \{nU: n \in N(a), U \in U(a)\}$ , and define  $\Omega_4'(a) = \Gamma(a) \times \{I\} \times P(a)$  and  $\Lambda_4'(a', a) = \Omega_4'(a') \times \Omega_4'(a)$ . Relax the assumption that  $\Gamma(a) \subseteq R_N$  to  $\Gamma(a) \subseteq C_N$ . Let  $H(a)$  be the convex hull of  $\{n^\ell(a) U^k(a): \ell=1, \dots, L(a), k=1, \dots, K(a)\}$ , where  $\{n^\ell(a): \ell=1, \dots, L(a)\}$  and  $\{U^k(a): k=1, \dots, K(a)\}$  are the extreme points for  $N(a)$  and  $U(a)$ , respectively. Define  $\Omega_4''(a) = H(a) \times \{I\} \times P(a)$  and  $\Lambda_4''(a', a) = \Omega_4''(a') \times \Omega_4''(a)$ .

COROLLARY 3.  $R(A, \Lambda_4'') \subseteq R(A, \Lambda_4') = R(A, \Lambda_5)$ . If  $r(a)$  is convex for all  $a \in A$ , then  $R(A, \Lambda_4'') = R(A, \Lambda_5)$ .

PROOF. The proof follows from Lemmas 1 and 3. □

Corollary 3 indicates that a properly constructed  $\Lambda$  can generate a lower bound on  $R(A, \Lambda_5)$  which may determine  $R(A, \Lambda_5)$  exactly and that  $R(A, \Lambda)$  can be approximated using the quadratic programming procedure used for determining  $R(A, \Lambda_4)$ .

EXAMPLE 5. Consider the problem stated in Example 4 which we modify as follows. Let  $n(a) = \gamma(a)$  for all  $a \in A$ , and assume

$$U(a) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & u_{22} & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

where  $0.9 \leq u_{22} \leq 1.0$ . Redefine  $\gamma(a) = n(a) U(a)$ . Then,

$$\begin{array}{lll} \gamma_1(1) = 0.5 & 0.9 \leq \gamma_2(1) \leq 1.0 & \gamma_3(1) = 0 \\ \gamma_1(2) = 1 & 0.36 \leq \gamma_2(2) \leq 0.6 & 0.4 \leq \gamma_3(2) \leq 0.6 \\ 0.4 \leq \gamma_1(3) \leq 0.6 & 0.9 \leq \gamma_2(3) \leq 1 & 0.4 \leq \gamma_3(3) \leq 0.6 \\ \gamma_1(4) = 0.5 & \gamma_2(4) = 0 & \gamma_3(4) = 1 \end{array}$$

Thus,  $r(a)$  is convex for all  $a \in A$  and  $R(A, \Lambda_4'') = R(A, \Lambda_5)$  from Corollary 3. Computations show that the parameter value imprecision is sufficient to imply that no alternative dominates any other alternative; thus,  $R(A, \Lambda_5) = \emptyset$ . □

## VIII. AN EXAMPLE APPLICATION

We now reexamine the hypothetical automobile purchasing problem presented by White and Sage (1980). This problem is modeled by Case 2 for the special case where  $N = 1$ , i.e. the decision making under certainty case. The objectives hierarchy is displayed in Figure 5. Each box corresponds to an attribute and an associated trade-off weight as described in Table 1. Each attribute corresponds to an objective; e.g. the attribute "safety" corresponds to the objective "maximize safety." When there is no confusion, we will use the attribute name as an abbreviated notation for the associated objective.

The objectives hierarchy indicates what objectives can be decomposed into "lower level" objectives. For example, "cost" is composed of "initial cost", "operating cost", and "resale value". Table 2 presents value scores for each of the six (6) automobiles under consideration for each of the lowest level objectives A through H. We assume that these value scores have been assessed from a well-informed DM. Since we note that the value score associated with alternative 1 is at least as great as the value score associated with alternative 5 for each lowest level objective, alternative 1 is preferred to alternative 5 no matter what trade-off weights are applied, i.e.  $(1, 5) \in R(A, \lambda_2)$  for  $P = R_8$ . Similarly,  $(2, 6) \in R(A, \lambda_2)$  for  $P = R_8$ . A graphical depiction of this preference information is presented in Figure 6 in the form of a domination digraph. Figure 6 indicates that there are four candidates for the most preferred automobile, cars 1, 2, 3, and 4, and since the objective

TABLE 1

## ATTRIBUTE NAMES AND ASSOCIATED WEIGHTS

<u>Attribute</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Weight</u>
A	safety	$\rho_1$
B	initial cost	$\rho_2$
C	fuel economy	$\rho_3$
D	scheduled maintenance expenses	$\rho_4$
E	expected unscheduled maintenance expenses	$\rho_5$
F	resale value	$\rho_6$
G	attractiveness	$\rho_7$
H	trunk and passenger compartment capacity	$\rho_8$
A-H	overall desirability	$\rho_1 + \dots + \rho_8$
C-E	operating cost	$\rho_3 + \rho_4 + \rho_5$
B-F	cost	$\rho_2 + \dots + \rho_6$




Figure 5. Objectives Hierarchy for the Automobile Purchasing Example

Table 2. Value Scores for Lowest Level Objectives

		VALUE SCORES FOR OBJECTIVES							
		A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
ALTERNATIVES	$x_1$	70	100	65	40	80	10	100	60
	$x_2$	100	40	70	30	100	100	10	100
	$x_3$	60	35	70	35	10	10	40	50
	$x_4$	50	0	100	100	0	90	10	100
	$x_5$	65	40	0	40	75	0	30	55
	$x_6$	0	35	60	0	90	40	0	0

is to select the single most preferred automobile, cars 5 and 6 can be excluded from further consideration.

If the DM can select his or her most preferred alternative from the set  $\{1, 2, 3, 4\}$ , then the decision aiding process can stop. If not, additional preference information must be assessed in order to reduce the nondominated set of alternatives. Assume the DM first decides to express his or her preferences regarding the "cost" branch of the objectives hierarchy. Assume that in evaluating the relative merits of fuel economy (objective C) and scheduled maintenance expenses (objective D), the DM finds the difference in fuel economy between the car with the highest fuel economy (car 4) and the car with the lowest fuel economy (car 5) to be less important than the difference in scheduled maintenance expenses between the car with the highest scheduled maintenance expenses and the car with the lowest scheduled maintenance expenses. More succinctly, scheduled maintenance expenses are relatively at least as important as fuel economy. This preference might have a variety of explanations, e.g. all of the cars under consideration give relatively high, and relatively similar, miles per gallon. We express this preference mathematically as  $\rho_3 \leq \rho_4$ . Using similar arguments, assume also that the DM expresses other preferences that can be modeled by the following inequalities:

$$\rho_4 \leq \rho_5$$

$$\rho_3 + \rho_4 + \rho_5 \leq \rho_2 \leq \rho_6$$

Thus, expected unscheduled maintenance expense is considered relatively at least as important as scheduled maintenance expense, and resale




Figure 6. Domination Digraph for Table 2.

value is considered relatively at least as important as initial cost which in turn is considered relatively at least as important as operating cost. These inequalities produce the following C matrix and c vector:

$$C = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 & -1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & -1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & -1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & -1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \quad c = \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

The associated domination digraph is given in Fig. 7, indicating that search for the most preferred automobile can be restricted to cars 1 and 2.

If the DM cannot or wishes not to decide between cars 1 and car 2, further preference information must be assessed. Assume that the DM has the following preferences:

- (i) Trunk and passenger compartment capacity is relatively at least twice as important as attractiveness.
- (ii) Safety is relatively at least twice as important as trunk and passenger compartment capacity and attractiveness combined.
- (iii) Cost is relatively at least twice as important as trunk and passenger compartment capacity and attractiveness combined.

Thus,



Figure 7. Domination Digraph for the Automobile Purchasing Example  
After the First Set of Preference Inequalities.

$$\rho_8 \geq 2 \rho_7$$

$$\rho_1 \geq 2 (\rho_7 + \rho_8)$$

$$\rho_2 + \rho_3 + \rho_4 + \rho_5 + \rho_6 \geq 2 (\rho_7 + \rho_8),$$

producing the following C matrix and c vector:

$$C = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 1 & -1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & -1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & -1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & -1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 2 & -1 \\ -1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 2 & 2 \\ 0 & -1 & -1 & -1 & -1 & -1 & 2 & 2 \end{bmatrix} \quad c = \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

The resulting domination digraph is shown in Figure 8, indicating that car 2 is the most preferred. We remark that this selection was made without having to be precise about ratios of the form  $\rho_i / \rho_j$ , as may be required in (White and Sage, 1980), and without having to trade-off some relatively controversial objectives, e.g. comparing the relative worth of safety and cost.

The solution procedure used for this problem was the linear programming approach. Solution of the 30 requisite linear programs required 12.3 CPU seconds before the trade-off and 13.5 CPU seconds after the trade-off of the University of Virginia CDC 6400. We would expect these figures to at most double if the process of constructing the criteria for the linear programs was built into the software. We feel such computer times are quite adequate for interactive decision aiding.




Figure 8. Domination Digraph for the Automobile Purchasing Example  
After the Second Set of Preference Inequalities.

## IX. CONCLUSIONS

A general model of single-stage decisionmaking has been formulated and analyzed. The criterion was composed of alternative dependent parameters having values that may be only partially known. Four special cases of imprecise parameter information were considered in detail and solution or approximation techniques determined for them. These special cases model an important variety of choicemaking situations involving imprecisely known parameter values. A hypothetical automobile purchasing example was used to illustrate the potential of the decision aiding procedure implied by one of the special cases.

## REFERENCES

Edwards, W., "How to Use Multiattribute Utility Measurement for Social Decisionmaking," IEEE Trans. Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, SMC-7, pp. 326-339, May, 1977.

Fischhoff, B., Goitein, B., and Shipera, Z., "The Expected Utility of Expected Utility Approaches," Command and Control Decision and Forecasting Systems Program, Tech. Report PTR-1091-80-4, April, 1980.

Kelly, C. W., "Decision Aids: Engineering Science and Clinical Art", Technical Report, Decisions and Designs, Inc., McLean, VA., 1978.

Matheiss, T. H., and Rubin, D. S., "A Survey and Comparison of Methods for Finding All Vertices of Convex Polyhedral Sets," Math. O.R., 5, pp. 167-185, 1980.

Potter, J. M., and Anderson, B. D. O., "Partial Prior Information and Decisionmaking," IEEE Trans. Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, SMC-10, pp. 125-133, 1980.

Sage, A. P., Methodology for Large-Scale Systems New York, McGraw-Hill, 1977.

Smallwood, R. D., and Sondik, E. J., "The Optimal Control of Partially Observable Markov Processes Over a Finite Horizon," Operations Research, 21, 1300-22, 1973.

Spetzler, C. S., and Stael von Holstein, C-A. S., "Probability Encoding in Decision Analysis," Management Science, 22, pp. 340-358, 1975.

White, C. C., "Multi-parametric Sensitivity in Decision Making Under Uncertainty," Computers and Biomedical Research, 12, pp. 125-130, 1979.

White, C. C., Wilson, E. C., and Weaver, A. C., "Decision Aid Development for Use in Ambulatory Health Care Settings," Dept. of Applied Math. and Comp. Science, Tech. Report, University of Virginia, 1980.

White, C. C., and Sage, A. P., "A Multiple Objective Optimization Based Approach to Choicemaking," IEEE Trans. Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, SMC-10, pp. 315-326, 1980.

White, C. C., and Sage, A. P., "Multiple Objective Evaluation and Choicemaking Under Risk with Partial Preference Information," Systems Engineering Research Rep. 81-2, University of Virginia, 1981.

A.

DISTRIBUTION LIST

OSD

CDR Paul R. Chatelier  
Office of the Deputy Under Secretary  
of Defense  
OUSDRE (E&LS)  
Pentagon, Room 3D129  
Washington, D.C. 20301

Department of the Navy

Director  
Engineering Psychology Programs  
Code 455  
Office of Naval Research  
800 North Quincy Street  
Arlington, VA 22217 (5 cys)

Director  
Operations Research Programs  
Code 434  
Office of Naval Research  
800 North Quincy Street  
Arlington, VA 22217

Director  
Statistics and Probability Program  
Code 436  
Office of Naval Research  
800 North Quincy Street  
Arlington, VA 22217

Director  
Information Systems Program  
Code 437  
Office of Naval Research  
800 North Quincy Street  
Arlington, VA 22217

Code 430B  
Office of Naval Research  
800 North Quincy Street  
Arlington, VA 22217

LCDR W. Moroney  
Code 55MP  
Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, CA 93940

Department of the Navy

Commanding Officer  
ONR Eastern/Central Regional Office  
ATTN: Dr. J. Lester  
Building 114, Section D  
666 Summer Street  
Boston, MA 02210

Commanding Officer  
ONR Branch Office  
ATTN: Dr. C. Davis  
536 South Clark Street  
Chicago, IL 60605

Commanding Officer  
ONR Western Regional Office  
ATTN: Dr. E. Gloye  
1030 East Green Street  
Pasadena, CA 91106

Office of Naval Research  
Scientific Liaison Group  
American Embassy, Room A-407  
APO San Francisco, CA 96503

Director  
Naval Research Laboratory  
Technical Information Division  
Code 2627  
Washington, D.C. 20375 (6 cys)

Dr. Bruce Wald  
Communications Sciences Division  
Code 7500  
Naval Research Laboratory  
Washington, D.C. 20375

Dr. Robert G. Smith  
Office of the Chief of Naval  
Operations, OP987H  
Personnel Logistics Plans  
Washington, D.C. 20350

Naval Training Equipment Center  
ATTN: Technical Library  
Orlando, FL 32813

Department of the Navy

Human Factors Department  
Code N215  
Naval Training Equipment Center  
Orlando, FL 32813

Dr. Alfred F. Smode  
Training Analysis and Evaluation  
Group  
Naval Training Equipment Center  
Code N-00T  
Orlando, FL 32813

Dr. George Moeller  
Human Factors Engineering Branch  
Submarine Medical Research Lab  
Naval Submarine Base  
Groton, CT 06340

Dr. James McGrath, Code 302  
Navy Personnel Research and  
Development Center  
San Diego, CA 92152

Navy Personnel Research and  
Development Center  
Planning and Appraisal  
Code 04  
San Diego, CA 92152

Navy Personnel Research and  
Development Center  
Management Systems, Code 303  
San Diego, CA 92152

Navy Personnel Research and  
Development Center  
Performance Measurement and  
Enhancement  
Code 309  
San Diego, CA 92152

CDR P. M. Curran  
Code 604  
Human Factors Engineering Division  
Naval Air Development Center  
Warminster, PA 18974

Dean of the Academic Departments  
U.S. Naval Academy  
Annapolis, MD 21402

Department of the Navy

Dr. Gary Poock  
Operations Research Department  
Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, CA 93940

Dean of Research Administration  
Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, CA 93940

Mr. Warren Lewis  
Human Engineering Branch  
Code 8231  
Naval Ocean Systems Center  
San Diego, CA 92152

Dr. A. L. Slafkosky  
Scientific Advisor  
Commandant of the Marine Corps  
Code RD-1  
Washington, D.C. 20380

Department of the Army

Mr. J. Barber  
HQs, Department of the Army  
DAPE-MBR  
Washington, D.C. 20310

Dr. Joseph Zeidner  
Technical Director  
U.S. Army Research Institute  
5001 Eisenhower Avenue  
Alexandria, VA 22333

Director, Organizations and  
Systems Research Laboratory  
U.S. Army Research Institute  
5001 Eisenhower Avenue  
Alexandria, VA 22333

Department of the Air Force

U.S. Air Force Office of Scientific  
Research  
Life Sciences Directorate, NL  
Bolling Air Force Base  
Washington, D.C. 20332

Department of the Air Force

Dr. Donald A. Topmiller  
Chief, Systems Engineering Branch  
Human Engineering Division  
USAF AMRL/HES  
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433

Air University Library  
Maxwell Air Force Base, AL 36112

Dr. Erl Alluuisi  
Chief Scientist  
AFHRL/CCN  
Brooks AFB, TX 78235

Foreign Addresses

North East London Polytechnic  
The Charles Myers Library  
Livingstone Road  
Stratford  
London E15 2LJ  
ENGLAND

Professor Dr. Carl Graf Hoyos  
Institute for Psychology  
Technical University  
8000 Munich  
Arcisstr 21  
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Dr. Kenneth Gardner  
Applied Psychology Unit  
Admiralty Marine Technology  
Establishment  
Teddington, Middlesex TW11 0LN  
ENGLAND

Director, Human Factors Wing  
Defence & Civil Institute of  
Environmental Medicine  
Post Office Box 2000  
Downsview, Ontario M3M 3B9  
CANADA

Dr. A. D. Baddeley  
Director, Applied Psychology Unit  
Medical Research Council  
15 Chaucer Road  
Cambridge, CB2 2EF, ENGLAND

Other Government Agencies

Defense Technical Information Center  
Cameron Station, Bldg. 5  
Alexandria, VA 22314 (12 cys)

Dr. Craig Fields  
Director, Cybernetics Technology  
Office  
Defense Advanced Research Projects  
Agency  
1400 Wilson Blvd  
Arlington, VA 22209

Dr. Judith Daly  
Cybernetics Technology Office  
Defense Advanced Research Projects  
Agency  
1400 Wilson Blvd  
Arlington, VA 22209

Other Organizations

Dr. Gary McClelland  
Institute of Behavioral Sciences  
University of Colorado  
Boulder, CO 80309

Dr. Miley Merkhofer  
Stanford Research Institute  
Decision Analysis Group  
Menlo Park, CA 94025

Dr. Jesse Orlansky  
Institute for Defense Analyses  
400 Army-Navy Drive  
Arlington, VA 22202

Professor Judea Pearl  
Engineering Systems Department  
University of California-Los Angeles  
405 Hilgard Avenue  
Los Angeles, CA 90024

Professor Howard Raiffa  
Graduate School of Business  
Administration  
Harvard University  
Soldiers Field Road  
Boston, MA 02163

Other Organizations

Dr. Arthur I. Siegel  
Applied Psychological Services, Inc.  
404 East Lancaster Street  
Wayne, PA 19087

Dr. Paul Slovic  
Decision Research  
1201 Oak Street  
Eugene, OR 97401

Dr. Amos Tversky  
Department of Psychology  
Stanford University  
Stanford, CA 94305

Dr. Robert T. Hennessy  
NAS - National Research Council  
JH #819  
2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20418

Dr. M. G. Samet  
Perceptronics, Inc.  
6271 Variel Avenue  
Woodland Hills, CA 91364

Dr. Meredith P. Crawford  
American Psychological Association  
Office of Educational Affairs  
1200 17th Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20036

Dr. Ward Edwards  
Director, Social Science Research  
Institute  
University of Southern California  
Los Angeles, CA 90007

Dr. Charles Gettys  
Department of Psychology  
University of Oklahoma  
455 West Lindsey  
Norman, OK 73069

Dr. Kenneth Hammond  
Institute of Behavioral Science  
University of Colorado  
Room 201  
Boulder, CO 80309

Other Organizations

Dr. William Howell  
Department of Psychology  
Rice University  
Houston, TX 77001

Journal Supplement Abstract Service  
American Psychological Association  
1200 17th Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20036 (3 cys)

Dr. John Payne  
Duke University  
Graduate School of Business  
Administration  
Durham, NC 27706

Dr. Baruch Fischhoff  
Decision Research  
1201 Oak Street  
Eugene, OR 97401

Dr. Leonard Adelman  
Decisions and Designs, Inc.  
8400 Westpark Drive, Suite 600  
P. O. Box 907  
McLean, VA 22101

Dr. Lola Lopes  
Department of Psychology  
University of Wisconsin  
Madison, WI 53706

**UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA**  
**School of Engineering and Applied Science**

The University of Virginia's School of Engineering and Applied Science has an undergraduate enrollment of approximately 1,400 students with a graduate enrollment of approximately 600. There are 125 faculty members, a majority of whom conduct research in addition to teaching.

Research is an integral part of the educational program and interests parallel academic specialties. These range from the classical engineering departments of Chemical, Civil, Electrical, and Mechanical and Aerospace to departments of Biomedical Engineering, Engineering Science and Systems, Materials Science, Nuclear Engineering and Engineering Physics, and Applied Mathematics and Computer Science. In addition to these departments, there are interdepartmental groups in the areas of Automatic Controls and Applied Mechanics. All departments offer the doctorate; the Biomedical and Materials Science Departments grant only graduate degrees.

The School of Engineering and Applied Science is an integral part of the University (approximately 1,530 full-time faculty with a total enrollment of about 16,000 full-time students), which also has professional schools of Architecture, Law, Medicine, Commerce, Business Administration, and Education. In addition, the College of Arts and Sciences houses departments of Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry and others relevant to the engineering research program. This University community provides opportunities for interdisciplinary work in pursuit of the basic goals of education, research, and public service.

